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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the property rate base. ' 17 Something more than the form of
the method would have thus been preserved.
In a series of cases over the past several years, the Louisiana
Public Service Commission has sought to stem the tide of rail-
road station closings by practically requiring out-of-pocket loss
and almost negligible disturbance to public interest before ap-
proval.18 At this term, in Missouri Pacific R.R. v. Louisiana
Public Service Commission,9 the railroad demonstrated station
losses by attributing one-half of the revenues from in and out
freight to the station proposed to be closed and by prorating
system-wide expenses to it on the basis of the system ratio of
such expenses to revenue. Denying the application, the Com-
mission urged that all revenues, both in and out, should be
attributed to the station sought to be closed and that system-
wide expenses should not be prorated. 20 Both of these positions
were rejected by the court, quite properly it would seem, since
they are hardly plausible on their face as accounting procedures
and were supported by no expert accounting opinion from the
Commission or elsewhere.2 1 It seems regrettable that a decision
so plausible was not made at the administrative level.
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
Robert L. Roland*
As far as the past term is concerned, students of state and
local taxation could possibly better spend their time elsewhere.
Although eight cases were decided, five of them were companion
cases and none of the cases, with the possible exception of one
use tax case, are of any lasting importance as points for future
reference and use.
Collector of Revenue, State of Louisiana v. John W. Olvey,
17. Id. at 299, 118 So.2d at 392.
18. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1958-1959 Term
Public Utilities, 20 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 294, 295-96 (1960); The Work of
the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1957-1958 Term - Administrative Law, 19
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 351, 361 (1959).
19. 238 La. 243, 115 So.2d 337 (1959).
20. Id. at 24647, 115 So.2d at 338-39.
21. Ibid.
*Member, Baton Rouge Bar; former Collector of Revenue for the State of
Louisiana; and Special Lecturer in Law, Louisiana State University.
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Sr. and Eula P. Olvey' was one of five cases2 against the Olvey
interests which were concerned with remedies for collection of
income taxes. The taxpayer contended that an income taxpayer
had an inalienable right to be proceeded against by use of the
assessment procedure3 with a corresponding right of appeal to
the Board of Tax Appeals. In light of the clear language of R.S.
47:1561 expressly conferring upon the collector the right to pro-
ceed by any of three "alternative remedies or procedures," it is
hard to see where the taxpayer had any chances of success. But
succeed he did in the trial court. However, on appeal, Justice
McCaleb, in another one of his concise and well-reasoned opin-
ions, pointed out that the provisions relative to assessment were
of general application and in no way limited the collector's right
to alternative remedies. He also rejected defendant's contention
that the giving of the discretion to the collector to pursue any of
three alternative procedures violated the constitutional provi-
sions relative to separation of powers 4 and equal protection of
the laws.5 The decision seems eminently correct not only in law
but from a practical viewpoint as well."
A much more complex problem was presented in the case of
Bel Oil Corporation v. Fontenot,7 although the practical ap-
proach of the legislature in changing to a severance tax levy
when the escrowing of the gas gathering tax money made the
substantial amount of funds involved unavailable for state ex-
penditures, rendered the matter academic, even if not moot.8 In
an opinion by Chief Justice Fournet, the court held that the gas
gathering tax was a license tax on the exercise of a right under
the lease and therefore void under the provisions of Section 21
1. 238 La. 980, 117 So.2d 563 (1960).
2. The remaining four are: Collector of Revenue v. John W. Olvey and Mary
R. G. Olvey, 238 La. 998, 117 So.2d 569 (1960) ; Collector of Revenue v. John W.
Olvey, Jr., Administrator of the Estate of Jean Olvey (Minor), 238 La. 999, 117
So.2d 569 (1960) ; Collector of Revenue v. John W. Olvey, Jr., Administrator of
the Estate of John W. Olvey, III (Minor), 238 La. 1000, 117 So.2d 570 (1960) ;
Collector of Revenue v. John W. Olvey, Jr., Administrator of the Estate of Mar-
garet Ann Olvey (Minor), 238 La. 1001, 117 So.2d 570 (1960).
3. LA. R.S. 47:1562-1565 (1950).
4. LA. CoNST. art. II, §§ 1, 2, as amended.
5. U.S. CoNrST. amend. 14.
6. The Louisiana legislature, at its 1960 session, showed no interest in chang-
ing the law. The House Committee on Ways and Means reported unfavorably a
bill designed to require the use of the assessment procedure in income tax cases.
(See Nineteenth Day's Proceeding, Official Journal - House of Representatives) ;
the Senate Committee on Judiciary A on June 8, 1960, did likewise. (See Senate
Calendar, 23rd Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature.)
7. 238 La. 1002, 117 So.2d 571 (1960).
8. LA. R.S. 47:681.1 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1958(ES.), No. 3.
19611
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of Article 10 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921, as amended.
The court made short shrift of the state's argument that there
was little difference between the tax imposed on the act of
gathering gas and the tax on the use of power necessary to pump
gas or oil, upheld in the H. L. Hunt9 case or the ad valorem tax
imposed upon the gathering lines, derricks, and other equipment,
sustained in the Meyers10 case, or the Baton Rouge occupational
license tax measured in part by the sale of gasoline despite the
constitutional prohibition" against the municipal levy of an
excise, license, or privilege tax upon gasoline, involved in the
Roberts1 case. The court in its own words "summarily disposed
of [the cases] because they are clearly without application." The
writer believes that the state's arguments merited much better
treatment than they received, but freely admits to being too close
to this case to exercise a completely impartial point of view, and
in light of the views of the United States Supreme Court as ex-
pressed in the Michigan-Wisconsin" cases and some of the Fed-
eral Power Commission cases 14 on the pricing of natural gas,
perhaps the conclusion of the court in this case was the easiest
solution to a very difficult problem.
In Maplewood Housing Corporation v. Fontenot, 5 the court
had under consideration the provisions of the Louisiana Cor-
poration Franchise Tax' 6 which provides in part that surplus
and undivided profits shall be deemed to have such value as is
reflected on the books, subject to the right of the collector to
revise up to the cost of the asset at time of acquisition by the tax-
payer and which further provides that in no event shall such
value be less than is shown on the books.' 7 The evidence showed
that plaintiff's New York certified public accountants in July
1953, by means of a journal entry, increased the book value of
certain assets by about $2,000,000.00, effective as of December
31, 1952. This amount represented the difference between ap-
praisal value at that time and the cost of the items. Plaintiff's
bookkeeper testified the corporation had some definite advan-
tages in mind in making the entry. In filing its 1953 franchise
9. State e rel. Porterie v. H. L. Hunt, Inc., 182 La. 1073, 162 So. 777 (1935).
10. Meyers v. Flournoy, 209 La. 812, 25 So.2d 601 (1946).
11. LA. CoNsT. art. XIV, § 24.1, as amended.
:12. Roberts v. Baton Rouge, 236 La. 521, 108 So.2d 111 (1958).
13. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 (1954).
14. E.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
15. 238 La. 378, 115 So.2d 386 (1959).
16. LA. R.S. 47:601 et seq. (1950).
17. Id. 47:605.
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tax return, based on its 1952 balance sheet, plaintiff did not take
into consideration the journal entry in question. After the col-
lector made a formal demand for additional taxes on the basis
of the value shown on the books, plaintiff reversed the entry and
claimed no additional tax was due. In sustaining the collector's
determination of the additional tax, the court said:
"Plaintiff has attempted on one hand to use the increased
valuation for purposes which it deemed for its own advantage
while on the other hand it has ignored the increase in value
for purposes of ascertaining its franchise tax liability. This
it cannot do.""'
In light of the specific language of the statute providing that "in
no event shall such value be less than is shown on the books"'19
and the facts involved in this case, the decision seems completely
sound, particularly since the court apparently leaves open the
question of whether or not adjusting entries can be made for
purposes of correcting erroneous entries.
One last case requires comment. Although it involved an ex-
ception of no cause of action, the case of Chrysler Corporation v.
New Orleans20 is important in that it indicated the court's atti-
tude towards the applicability of the relatively recent and much
discussed Michigan use tax cases 21 decided by the United States
Supreme Court. The Chrysler Corporation paid under protest
to the city use taxes and interest amounting to slightly more
than $500,000.00 upon property used by it in performing certain
governmental contracts relative to the operation of a tank engine
facility at Michoud. The petition alleged that title to the prop-
erty was at all times in the United States government. The city
filed an exception of no cause of action on the basis of the Michi-
gan cases which was sustained by the trial court. The Michigan
cases in essence had held a tax upon the user of property, the
title to which was in the federal government, was not a tax upon
the federal government, and hence was valid. The Louisiana
Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Hawthorne, concluded
that the New Orleans tax did not by its terms seek to tax the use
of such property. The court laid considerable emphasis upon the
18. 238 La. 378, 389, 115 So.2d 386, 389 (1959).
19. LA. R.S. 47:605 (1950).
20. 238 La. 123, 114 So.2d 579 (1959).
21. United States of America and Borg-Warner Corp. (Detroit Gear Division)
v. Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958) ; United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355
U.S. 484 (1958) ; Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489 (1958).
1961]
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words "incidental to the ownership thereof" which it found to
qualify the word "use." Chief Justice Fournet, although appar-
ently of the opinion that the word "use" was broader in scope
than the majority found it to be, concurred since the ordinance
itself provided one measure (cost price) where the use was by
owners and another measure (profits or rents) where the use
was by lessees. The question involved here is not free from
doubt, but in light of the complicated nature of the case, it is
not surprising that the court overruled the exception of no cause
of action, particularly since there was considerable difference in
the language of the statutes involved.
